Epidemiologic and Economic Research,
and the Question of Smoking Bans
Michael L. Marlow, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT
Smoking bans in public places are promoted on the dual basis
that they protect the public from “secondhand smoke”—
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), and that bans never harm
businesses. Evidence shows that ETS does not pose health risks
nearly as large as many ban advocates claim, and that bans do harm
some businesses. Unintended and adverse consequences of
smoking bans include (1) harm to smokers if they compensate by
smoking more intensely; (2) an increase in drunk driving when
smokers drive longer distances to smoke and drink; and (3) less
innovation in air-filtration technology that also slows progress in
removing hazards other than tobacco smoke.

The Rationale for Bans
Public health advocates claim that smoking bans in public places
are necessary to protect the public from environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS), often called “secondhand smoke.” Advocates also
assert that communities can mandate bans without fear that they
harm any business owners. Advocates go so far as to claim that bans
often raise profits and so, in effect, owners should thank advocates
for increasing their wealth. There are two widely cited literature
reviews that concern economic impacts.
The first claims that all of the studies that found a negative impact
were supported by the tobacco industry. While 94 percent of the
tobacco industry-supported studies reported a negative economic
impact, none of the non-industry supported studies had this result.
“All of the best-designed studies report no impact or a positive
impact of smoke-free restaurant and bar laws on sales or
employment,” the authors state. “Therefore, policymakers can act to
protect workers and patrons from the toxins in secondhand smoke
confident in rejecting industry claims that there will be an adverse
1
economic impact.”
The second article states that it “reviews the spread of clean
indoor air laws, the effect on public health, and the scientific
evidence of the economic impact of clean indoor air laws.” It finds
that the “vast majority of scientific evidence” shows no negative
economic impact of clean indoor air policies, with “many studies
finding that there may be some positive effects on local
businesses,… despite the fact that tobacco industry-sponsored
research has attempted to create fears to the contrary.” The article
recognizes the importance of documenting economic impact,
especially within the hospitality industry, for “further progress in the
2
diffusion of clean indoor air laws.”
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The strategy of presenting evidence in two disciplines—
epidemiology and economics—is used to promote smoking bans. To
gain support of the nonsmoking public, the risk of ETS, while it may
exist, is overstated. To overcome resistance of business owners, it is
repeatedly asserted that bans never harm business, although neither
theory nor evidence supports this claim.
Epidemiologic Research on ETS
Research on ETS does not fully support claims that it poses
significant health risk. A recent review of the many studies of risks
associated with ETS exposure concludes that “reported studies do not
offer consistent results, and overall cannot be interpreted for or against
risk.”3 Of the 75 published studies of ETS and lung cancer, 70 percent
did not report statistically significant differences of risk, 17 percent
claim an increased risk, and 13 percent imply a reduction of risk.
Michael Siegel summarizes the epidemiologic evidence in the
following way:
While there is ample evidence that chronic exposure to
secondhand smoke increases the risk of cardiovascular
disease, and therefore heart attack risk, and there is some
suggestive evidence that acute exposure to secondhand
smoke may present some danger of risk to individuals with
existing severe coronary artery disease, there appears to be no
scientific basis for claims that brief, acute, transient exposure
to secondhand smoke increases heart attack risk in
individuals without coronary disease, that it increases such
risk to the level observed in smokers, that it can cause
atherosclerosis, that it can cause fatal or catastrophic cardiac
arrhythmias, or that it represents any other significant acute
4
cardiovascular health hazard in nonsmokers.
Roger Jenkins, noted researcher on composition and
measurement of ETS smoke, concludes that the typical smoker
inhales 480 milligrams of smoke, and 32 milligrams of nicotine per
day.5 In a home where smoking is unrestricted, the typical nonsmoker
will inhale the equivalent of 0.45 milligrams of smoke particles and
0.028 milligrams of nicotine. Jenkins also estimates that the average
nonsmoking woman’s exposure to ETS from living with a smoker
would be equivalent to 8 to 10 cigarettes’ worth of nicotine and
6
particles over the course of a year.
The harm from ETS is frequently overstated. In 2006, for
example, the Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) claimed:
“Breathing drifting tobacco smoke for as little as 30 minutes (less
than the time one might be exposed sitting on a park bench) can raise
7
a non-smoker’s risk of a fatal heart attack to that of a smoker.” Siegel
has counted at least 65 groups making similar claims, including the
American Cancer Society and the UK National Health Service.7
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Epidemiologist Carl V. Phillips summarizes the case for smoking
bans, based on evidence regarding public health:
There is little doubt that inhaling smoke is unhealthy, but
equally clear evidence shows that we can only demonstrate
disease risk from ETS for those at the highest level of
exposure. The evidence about health effects of smoke and the
legitimate aesthetic objection to involuntary ETS exposure
are quite sufficient to justify prohibiting indoor smoking in
public places, though clearly insufficient to justify public
policies that prohibit voluntary low-level ETS gain.8
This view suggests that the intense dislike of nonsmokers for
cigarette smoke, and its unhealthy nature provide ample reason to
ban smoking when nonsmokers cannot easily avoid it. When easily
avoidable, there are no compelling reasons why voluntary exposure
would need to be made illegal. It remains puzzling then why ban
advocates appear to exaggerate epidemiologic evidence when so
many citizens would support banning smoking in many, but not all
public places on the basis of aesthetics or accurate risk estimates.
Perhaps they are less concerned with protecting nonsmokers than
with eliminating tobacco use everywhere.
Economic Research on Smoking Bans
Smoking is commonly viewed as a case of smokers imposing
negative externalities on nonsmokers, and therefore of failure of
private markets to allocate resources efficiently. This viewpoint
singles out smokers as the sole source of the externality, thus leading
to the conventional solution that smoking should simply be banned.
The conventional view misses much when it singles out smokers
as the sole source of the problem. Ronald Coase (1960) introduced
the notion of “reciprocal nature of externalities” whereby both
parties—smokers and nonsmokers in this case—believe the other is
the source of the problem.9 Smokers do not like nonsmokers
complaining about their smoking, and nonsmokers do not like
smoke. This key insight is critical to understanding that opposing
parties have incentives to negotiate with each other over disputes.
Coase argued that, in absence of transaction costs, negotiation
achieves an efficient solution as long as resources are privately
owned and transferable. Those who value the airspace the most will
bid the most for the right to enjoy the airspace as they wish.
Ban advocates argue that transaction costs are too prohibitive.
But this is untrue in the hospitality industry because neither party
owns the air space. Business owners own it, and have financial
incentives to allocate it efficiently by mediating between smokers
and nonsmokers. Owners seeking to satisfy highest-valued users
may forbid smoking, offer smoking/nonsmoking sections, or
improve air-filtration systems and ventilation. A range of solutions
will therefore emerge.
The variety of private solutions has been demonstrated in five
peer-reviewed articles.10-14 This research demonstrates that owners
offer more nonsmoking seating and better ventilation when serving
fewer smoking customers. Some owners voluntarily ban all
smoking, but others allow smoking throughout, or dedicate areas
where smoking is not allowed. Thus it is incorrect to argue that
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owners never attempt to resolve smoking disputes. Moreover, it is
predictable that bans exert different effects on different businesses,
because customer bases differ: some owners will gain, others will
lose, and still others will be unaffected. It makes little sense to assert
that bans never harm, as is often claimed.
My research with Boyes and Dunham finds that owners with more
smoking customers predict losses more often than those with few
smoking customers. Owners are also shown to adjust prices, wages,
hours of operation, and other business attributes in response to bans;
thus, bans affect customers and workers. Moreover, bans are mostly
adopted in communities with fewer smokers, so jurisdictions that ban
smoking experience less harm than would occur if bans were forced
on communities with more smokers. Recent evidence of the effects of
bans in Scotland,15 the UK,16 and India17 reach similar conclusions.
Why, then, do so many studies show no harm? Most studies use a
“community effects” methodology that aggregates all businesses
within a community into one number and then examines whether this
number changes following a ban. Studies routinely conclude that
sales and tax aggregates never fall. This research method is like
looking at a classroom of 30 students, observing that average weight
is initially 150 pounds, and concluding that no changes occurred over
the following 10 years because average weight remained 150
pounds. Meanwhile, some students gained 20 pounds, some lost 10
pounds, and still others weigh the same as before. This misleading
method is routinely employed in studies concluding that bans harm
no businesses.
Ban advocates dismiss contrary research as biased, especially
when funded by the tobacco industry. They do not acknowledge,
however, that the majority of studies concluding that there is no harm
are funded by groups with vested interests in finding this result, such
as the Roswell Park Cancer Institute, the National Cancer Institute,
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and pharmaceutical
manufacturers selling nicotine-replacement therapies.18
Unfortunate and Unintended Consequences
The strategy of distorting the evidence to serve an agenda has
adverse consequences.
Smokers compensate in various ways when they are subjected to
tax hikes. They buy more cigarettes with higher tar and nicotine
yields.19,20 They may alter the intensity of smoking, defined as the ratio
of nicotine concentration to the number of cigarettes smoked.21
Epidemiologic research shows that more intense smoking is more
detrimental to health.22 Since bans, in effect, impose a tax rate of infinity
on consuming in banned locations, bans adversely affect health when
smokers compensate by smoking more intensely than prior to bans.
Overstating risk confuses the public about relative risks.
Fomenting worry about ETS increases the probability of enactment
of bans, and also promotes more funding for ETS research. Ban
advocates thus shift focus away from behavior—such as lack of
exercise, bad diets, or drunk driving—that might pose substantially
greater health risks. Funds spent on ETS are diverted from research
that might be more productive. Thus, decreasing the already small
risk of ETS translates into increasing total health risks.
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Paradoxically, bans may actually increase smoking. A study of
bans in Australia finds that they do not significantly reduce smoking
23
for most individuals. But they may cause a significant “rebellion”
effect among 18 to 24-year-old smokers, who became more likely to
continue smoking following bans. A “James Dean” effect on youth
may therefore exist, whereby bans make it easier to display
“antisocial” behavior through smoking.
An increase in fatal car crashes involving drunken drivers has
been reported after smoking bans are imposed in bars.24 Such
evidence is consistent with the explanation that bans cause smokers
to drive longer distances to get to bars in another jurisdiction where
they may continue to smoke.
Ironically, smoking bans may impede efforts to improve air
quality. Several leading advocates are alarmed that improved
ventilation could undermine passage of bans.25 Better ventilation and
air filtration could remove both ETS and other irritants and toxins,
such as wood smoke, cooking oil, and insecticides. But, because of
the singular focus on tobacco smoke, incentives for technologies that
improve overall air quality surely decrease following bans.
Overstatement fosters suspicion that epidemiologic research and
economic research are fast becoming junk science. Overzealous
advocacy for smoking bans serves to discredit fields of research that
can improve our lives in many ways. Phillips writes:
The activists involved, many of whom hold titles that
indicate that they should behave as scientists and academics,
appear unconcerned about subverting science to further their
worldly agendas, hurting the careers of honest scientists,
driving students away from politically controversial fields,
attacking the principles of free academic research, and
threatening the reputation of epidemiology as a field.8
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